The leader of the PRI, unlike in past contests, now only aims to win over non-Morena voters. Until 2024, the PRI still considered the possibility of recapturing voters who had fluctuated to Morena, but now that option is completely off the table. The main goal is now to attack the PAN's electoral base. This is understandable: Alito wants to force Jorge Romero into an alliance with the PRI in states like Nuevo León, Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Campeche. On closer inspection, Alito often says things that Marco Rubio would want to say about the Mexican administration if he were still a senator and not in the Department of State. The dynamic with MC is different because the PRI understands that in Nuevo León and Jalisco, the 'orange' voter has more in common with Morena than with the PRI-PAN bloc. The calculation in the PAN camp is the same: the non-alliance with the PRI is the key to completely eliminating the tricolor and conquering the entire opposition universe. The inevitable question is: why do both the PRI and the PAN seem resigned to the idea of attracting voters from the Morena spectrum? One explanation is the power of the 4T's clientelist machine, but fundamentally, going after the government's voters requires a discourse on domestic security that is untenable in the current bilateral relationship with the United States. But to do this, he must demonstrate to the PAN a real capacity for causing damage. This is where the Morena governors come in, whom Alito will seek to support his intention to erode the PAN. His message is clear: the Campeche native wants to present the PRI as the true opposition alternative, and in all his talks, he portrays Romero as a tepid leader without the drive to clash with the government. The government believes this is possible due to Alito's connections in the US, a series of agreements that shield him from the impulses of the 4T. In the PRI, the strategy for Alejandro Moreno Cárdenas towards 2027 is beginning to take shape.
