Pemex continues to be a structural factor of fiscal fragility. The IMF was clear in its 2025 review: the official consolidation path would not be enough to put debt on a firm downward trajectory and could take it to 61.5 percent of GDP by 2030. That is why it recommended a deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP for 2027, in addition to strengthening permanent revenues and cleaning up public companies. Even when renewing the Flexible Credit Line for 24 billion dollars, the Fund itself recognized Mexico's resilience, but insisted on the need for broader fiscal scope. This does not mean that Mexico is on the brink of a fiscal crisis. On April 1, in accordance with what the law stipulates, the Ministry of Finance delivered to Congress the so-called Economic Policy Pre-criteria for 2027. This is the first official document that establishes the government's vision of how the economy and public finances will be next year. The Pre-criteria tell a story that, at first glance, seems reassuring. The Ministry of Finance traces a path where the Financial Requirements of the Public Sector fall from 4.9 percent of GDP this year to 3.5 percent in 2027, with a primary balance that moves into positive territory. The broad public debt would move from 54.7 to 55.0 percent of GDP, between 2026 and 2027, a trajectory that the Ministry of Finance presents as compatible with fiscal stability. But the real issue is not whether there is a downward deficit trajectory, but whether it is enough to guarantee fiscal sustainability in an environment of low growth, still relatively high rates, and growing spending pressures. That is where the doubts begin. The Ministry of Finance maintains for 2026 a growth range of between 1.8 and 2.8 percent, and raises it to between 1.9 and 2.9 percent for 2027. Outside the government, skepticism is evident. The OECD projects only 1.3 percent in 2026 and 1.7 percent in 2027, and also raised its inflation forecast to 3.8 percent for this year, five tenths more than it estimated in December. The most recent Banxico growth estimate is 1.6 percent for this year and 2.0 percent for 2027, a more cautious view than that of the Ministry of Finance. If real growth ends up closer to the private consensus than to the official range, the fiscal adjustment will become more difficult. Not only because revenue would grow less, but because the temptation to compensate for economic weakness with more spending or extraordinary support would increase. And today Mexico does not have a large growth cushion: the OECD itself points out that preserving macroeconomic stability requires credible measures on both the spending and revenue sides. There is a second delicate element. But those factors are no longer enough on their own. The Pre-criteria, in that sense, are more a promise of balance than a conclusive proof of sustainability. The good news is that the Ministry of Finance does not give up on fiscal consolidation. The question is whether it can be done without further hurting an economy that, for now, continues to grow too slowly. The reduction of the deficit in 2027 rests, to a large extent, on a strong cut in programmable spending: a fall of 259,500 million pesos, equivalent to 6.8 percent in real terms compared to 2026. The future adjustment will not occur because inertial pressures disappear —non-programmable spending continues to rise due to financial cost and contributions to states—, but because the adjustment variable will once again be spending subject to budgetary decision, where investment, government operation, and state execution capacity coexist. The Ministry of Finance maintains that strategic investment will be protected. That is, without a doubt, the most important argument in favor of the plan. It is not the case. The country maintains relevant strengths: debt predominantly in national currency, at a fixed rate and with long maturities; access to markets; and a history of macroeconomic discipline that weighs in its favor. The bad one is that it bets on achieving it in an environment where almost everything is against it: low growth, external risks, inflationary pressures, and increasing obligations. The question is not whether the adjustment can be made. If infrastructure, water, energy, and housing projects are truly safeguarded, the adjustment would have a less recessive bias. But one thing is the intention and another is the arithmetic. When space narrows, a less visible but very costly deterioration usually appears: insufficient maintenance, lower administrative capacity, delays in public procurement, and weaker services. In addition, the shadow of Pemex persists. The Pre-criteria presume savings from debt amortization, but those savings are circumstantial.
