Judicial Impartiality in Mexico: Duty, Not Virtue

Judicial impartiality is not a mere virtue, but a constitutional obligation. Two years after Minister Lenia Batres Guadarrama's arrival at the supreme court, a debate is taking shape that transcends the personal and becomes a deep institutional discussion: the limits between ideological conviction and the duty of judicial neutrality. The issue does not arise from isolated opinions, but from verifiable data. A constitutional court depends, for its legitimacy, on all litigants—citizens, social organizations, or companies—perceiving that they will be heard under the same rules. As international judicial independence standards point out, impartiality has an objective dimension: it is not enough to be neutral; one must also appear so to society. Its strength depends less on speeches and more on the trust generated by its rulings. Judicial independence does not consist of aligning with the government or systematically confronting it. The legitimacy of a constitutional judge does not come from representing popular causes or maintaining coherent ideological positions, but from demonstrating—in each vote—that no conclusion is written before studying the case. For the strength of the rule of law rests on a simple but non-negotiable premise: before constitutional justice, everyone must have the real possibility of winning… and also of losing. When that expectation disappears, what is weakened is not a party in litigation, but the very trust in the Constitution, and of course, in the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. Constitutional control examines legality and constitutionality, not budgetary convenience. Accepting the opposite would imply introducing a political element into the judicial function: rights would only be enforceable when they were fiscally convenient for the State. The history of the Mexican amparo demonstrates precisely the opposite. This is an intense activity within the Constitutional Court. The Constitution recognizes guarantees for both individuals and legal entities, including legal certainty, due process, and effective access to justice. In the amparo proceeding, the Court does not evaluate who is litigating, but whether the act of authority respects or not the constitutional order. Therefore, judicial neutrality does not require the absence of personal ideas—something impossible—but the ability to submit those ideas to legal analysis case by case. The discussion takes on greater relevance when certain positions expressed in the public debate argue that the granting of amparos could be inconvenient if it impacts the public treasury. But when uniformity is maintained without exceptions across hundreds of decisions, the discussion ceases to be statistical and becomes institutional: is there sufficient argumentative openness towards all parties that come to the court? Mexican constitutionalism is based on a clear principle: rights do not depend on the identity of the litigant. Constitutional supremacy implies that legality precedes government convenience. In this context, the debate on Minister Batres's performance should not be understood as a confrontation between economic visions or development models. When a constant pattern of decisions generates the perception of a structural predisposition towards a certain type of litigants, the Court faces a reputational challenge that transcends any of its members. From a political perspective, the role of the Supreme Court becomes even more relevant. Judicial independence guarantees absolute freedom of judgment, and no minister is obliged to distribute rulings in balanced proportions. Its function is another: to impose constitutional order. From classical constitutional theory, this argument poses significant tensions: the financial cost of a ruling has never been a determining criterion for recognizing or denying fundamental rights. However, an analysis of her rulings shows a constant feature: no case has yet been identified in which she has supported the legal position of a private company in disputes against the State. The data, by itself, does not imply a legal irregularity. In a context of increasing polarization, the supreme court functions as the last space of institutional balance. The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation was not designed to reflect political majorities or to represent ideological causes. Its creation responded to the need to limit public power, even if this implied administrative, regulatory, or economic rectifications. The central point is institutional trust. It consists of something more complex: always deciding against whoever violates the Constitution, regardless of whether it is the State, a company, or a citizen. After two years in office, the performance of the so-called 'minister of the people' opens a necessary reflection on the contemporary role of the Mexican Court. During this period, the minister has participated as a rapporteur in 1,165 matters and has voted on nearly four thousand files.