The source of the problem lies in Sinaloa. The state accounts for the largest winter tomato production in the country. When Sinaloa reduces its supply, there is no immediate substitute to compensate for the drop. In the 2025-2026 cycle, the planted area shrank significantly: the Confederation of Agricultural Associations of the State of Sinaloa (Caades) estimated a decrease of close to 20%, while other sectoral sources placed it near 30%. By the end of March, the region's dam system was at 19.9 to 21.5% of its capacity, compared to almost 37% a year earlier. It is true, and some relief may be observed in the coming weeks. However, the underlying question remains: why is the entire country exposed every time Sinaloa faces a bad season? The answer points to structural problems that require urgent attention: the excessive regional concentration of supply, the dependence on an increasingly stressed water basin, security challenges in the countryside, and the lack of a comprehensive strategy that balances the strong export incentive with internal food security. Regions like Michoacán, Jalisco, and Baja California contribute to the national tomato supply, but they have not yet managed to compensate for the drop that occurred in Sinaloa. The tomato is not the king of the INPC, but it is its most temperamental product. What these weeks have made clear is that a bad season in Sinaloa can quickly become a national inflation problem and a direct hit to the cost of the basic basket for millions of families. To this situation, one must add the effects that the war will bring in the future and that will be reflected in the cost of food. It is a challenging future for the country's food policy. However, the end of the anti-dumping suspension agreement in July 2025, which brought with it a 21% tariff on the Mexican product and the tightening of phytosanitary rules, created a situation of uncertainty in the sector. The Ministry of Agriculture has stated that the price increase is seasonal and that prices will tend to normalize with the spring harvest. In March 2026, tomato prices increased by 42.01% monthly and represented almost 30% of the registered inflation. Its weight in the National Consumer Price Index (INPC) is only 0.79%, lower than that of tortilla, chicken, or eggs. It is the most visible signal of a structural fragility in Mexico's food supply system, excessively concentrated in a single region facing a complex problem. The statistical blow was clearly recorded. The tomato is not just a daily presence on our tables, but perhaps one of the fresh products that has the most to do with inflation. In the first week of April, a kilo of tomato was sold for over 55 pesos in several supply centers across the country. A year earlier, the same kilo was around 25 pesos. This is not just a seasonal jump. In recent months, the growing insecurity in the region has also affected agricultural activity. Producers and sector organizations have reported greater difficulties in accessing water, transporting goods, and maintaining stable labor, precisely due to insecurity. These factors, combined with high production costs and trade tensions, influenced the decision to reduce planting and generated additional costs throughout the supply chain. To this was added the commercial environment with the United States. Additionally, along with lemon, it was one of the products that most drove up the basic food basket in both urban and rural areas, affecting low-income households more strongly. All of that is the symptom. For an irrigation-intensive agriculture, that water restriction forced many producers to cut hectares before starting the season. However, it is especially volatile: while tomato prices soared, chicken rose only 2.82% and eggs even recorded a decrease. To this were added lower yields due to atypical cold episodes and phytosanitary problems. But explaining the increase solely due to drought and climate would be incomplete. Mexico exported fresh tomatoes for about 3,161 million dollars in 2024.
