Failed Reform Re-submitted: What's Happening with Power in Mexico?

Mexico has seen the partial adjustment and re-presentation of a bill to the Senate, with an equally predictable outcome. The structural intention to redesign the Mexican state, which culminated in reversing democratization, has now become an affront to federalism. How can this be explained in a system where presidential initiatives are negotiated and secured before being sent, all the more so if it involves 'making a deal' with allies? The immediate precedent is the attempt at political-electoral reform promoted by Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2022. That proposal did not pass due to the lack of a qualified majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The repetition of initiatives doomed to legislative failure does not seem like a miscalculation; rather, it reveals internal tensions, positioning strategies, and possibly a struggle for control of the political project. In a system that for decades revolved around the presidential figure, the fact that the Congress repeatedly rejects proposals from the Executive not only signals a break from historical inertia but also opens a window to observe the fissures of power in Mexico with greater clarity. At a time when Mexico faces external pressures—particularly in its relationship with the United States on security issues and ahead of the review of the regional trade treaty—placing electoral reform at the center of the debate could serve as a smokescreen to shift public attention away from more sensitive issues for governability. However, there is a third, more unsettling hypothesis that points to a real dispute over power. It seems unlikely that in any country, and for even greater reason in one as hyper-presidential as ours, an initiative from the Executive branch would meet the same fate as the electoral reform proposal presented by Dr. Claudia Sheinbaum. To understand the current moment, it is necessary to look back. The insistence on moving forward the presidential recall from 2028 to 2027 is no minor detail. If it were to happen, it would allow the president to use her political capital to decisively influence the mid-term elections—governorships, local congresses, and city halls—and consolidate her own leadership, reducing the weight of the now vital support of the person who nominated her. From this perspective, the resistance from some allies may not be explained solely by partisan calculations, but by deeper dynamics within the governing coalition itself. The fundamental question is inevitable: who wields political power in Mexico today? The president may be seeking to fulfill 'campaign promises,' as she has maintained, even knowing they will not be legislatively realized. Under this logic, the message is clear: the Executive is doing her part; if the reform does not advance, the responsibility falls on the allies or the opposition. A second reading points to agenda-setting. Is it the head of the Executive or her predecessor, who maintains influence over party and government structures? There are no definitive answers, but there are signs of an incomplete transition. Subsequently, the so-called 'Plan B,' designed as a legal reform to circumvent the constitutional obstacle, was invalidated by the Supreme Court of Justice due to irregularities in the legislative process. Far from closing the chapter, the then-president sowed the path for a 'Plan C,' now being taken up by Claudia Sheinbaum. The axis of the proposal has been clear: to redesign political representation—by reducing proportional representation at first instance or at least defining new routes to fill those seats—decrease public funding for political parties, and adjust the operational capabilities of electoral authorities. In its most radical versions, it even proposed the disappearance of local public electoral bodies. The content of the intended reform is unsurprising; it was meant to guarantee the continuity of the 4T, weaken the opposition by altering the rules of fair political competition, and consolidate the process of co-opting electoral authorities. What is surprising is the insistence on pushing it through without the necessary votes. Neither the Mexican Ecologist Green Party nor the Labor Party was willing to support an initiative that directly threatened their political and financial survival. Even so, the president sent the proposal to Congress, where it was rejected. I do not usually speculate; however, on this occasion, I will venture a few hypotheses. The first hypothesis is of a political-communicative nature. Someone explain to me what happened.